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Loren Lybarger’s essay aims to point out that once dominant secularism is still alive 
among Palestinians in Chicago, although those who embrace it live in a “marginal, 
disconnected space” brought on by the ascendance of Islamic religious institutions 
and faith-based organizations, businesses catering to an Islamic lifestyle, and 
persons choosing a pious Islamic “way of life.” He argues that even though 
secularism represents an apparent minority perspective among Palestinians [here I 
am not sure whether he means Muslim Palestinians or all Palestinians] examining it 
remains important. It is important because of the recent and increasing tendency 
among scholars to explain the actions of people who happen to be Muslim by 
referring to Islamic religious beliefs, values, practices, and history. Aside from 
potentially being wrong, these scholarly treatments obscure the social forces that 
shape Islamic identities as well as those that keep secularism alive. Furthermore, 
the overlapping and weaving complexities of human social life are obfuscated by 
when a secular/religious dichotomy is used as an analytic tool. Secularism and 
religious revival are “interactive and mutually constituting processes,” as each of 
these ideological positions is often deployed by persons and groups in response to 
the other. Finally, he argues that studying Palestinian secularism allows us to 
understand the mechanisms and processes that help it to persist. After reviewing 
some of the scholarly debates surrounding the terms “secular” and “religious,” 
Lybarger embraces the calls of Taylor, Casanova, and Starrett to carefully study the 
meanings attributed to and deployments undertaken in the name of these 
ideological stances. Secularism needs to be studied because people, groups, and 
states continue to take actions and counter actions in its name.  
 
Lybarger states that his analysis will emphasize the subjective meanings individuals 
ascribe to social action, which he organizes into patterned groupings using the 
Weberian tool of ideal types. He defines secularism as an ideal type of “recurring 
stance that individuals can adopt across a range of diverse social contexts” that 
“implicitly resists, rejects, demotes, or otherwise ignores the prior claim of religious 
solidarity” with religion positioned as “subordinate, ancillary, or relative to other 
identities.” Secularism can be a social orientation, practice, mode of solidarity, or 
stance. What makes an orientation secular is the “explicit rejection or implicit 
irrelevance to it of the primacy of religious authority as a foundation for individual 
ethics, social identification, political unity, and governance.”  
 
Surely secularism exists among Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, and I 
 2 
concur with the author that its continuing presence is often overshadowed by the 
focus of many scholars on matters Islamic. To me, the most interesting part of this 
essay is the part that interacts with the type of research I do as a sociologist who has 
long studied Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim American communities. In the following, 
I take a closer look at the three ideal-typical modes of secularism Lybarger 
discovered in his interviews and especially at the paths people are said to have 
taken to arrive at secularism, commenting on them using findings from my current 
and prior research. These comments do not indicate that the processes Lybarger 
identified are inaccurate, but they do suggest some complexities and next steps in 
data collection and analysis. As I explain below, with regard to “secularism in the 
Post-Islamic key” I would like to see what interviews with younger generations of 
Palestinian Americans might uncover. As for the two types of syncretic secularism 
Lybarger identified, I suggest that gendered upbringing explains some of the 
differences in the process towards secularism between the case studies of Ismael 
and Muna: in many ways their routes were determined by their gender as it 
intersects with how being raised as a Muslim in the US is interpreted and 
implemented by parents and community.  
 
The first ideal type Lybarger discusses is “secularism in the Post-Islamic key.” This is 
a discursive mode that reformulates pan-Arabist and leftist thinking in ways that 
respond to the rise of Islam in Chicago and in Palestine. Here we see clear evidence 
of a mutually constitutive process as these reformulations take into account and 
come to terms with the multiple ways that Islamic institutions, organizations, 
values, and lifestyles have increased in popularity and dominance. This is done 
discursively by interpreting actions and events that might give internal credibility to 
this upsurge as really being less about Islam and more about the failings and 
shortcomings of non-Islamic institutions and the harmful interventions of external 
others.  
 
According to Lybarger, this type of secular perspective is learned. It is passed down 
through family discussions and through the transmission of a collective narrative 
that is specific to secular community-based programs. These programs 
communicate such a narrative through Arabic classes and history lessons, cultural 
and artistic groups, and activist solidarities. In other words, learning this type of 
secularism requires family and community action. I wonder what impact the 
passage of time, globalization, and ongoing changes in Chicago’s Palestinian 
community have had on the life of this ideological perspective. Research data that I 
am now analyzing, based on interviews I conducted with ninety-three transnational 
Arab American teenagers [born and raised in the US, taken “back home” for high 
school], would suggest that meaningful vehicles of communication, as well as the 
narratives they convey, have changed for younger generations. With regard to 
Palestinian American teens, I found — to my enormous surprise — that the 
overwhelming majority had negative pre-dispositions toward Palestine before 
moving there with their families, had never read a book, heard a poem, or seen a 
film about Palestine, had not attended the programs of a secular Arab organization, 
and knew mostly, and sometimes only, that Palestine was a violent place. While 
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these teens had a strong identification with Palestine instilled by their parents, very 
few had internalized any type of collective narrative, whether secular, religious, or 
other, about Palestine. This includes youth who attended Arabic classes [Qur’an] at 
religious institutions, for indeed religious institutions were usually the only sources 
of such language training. [It is important to point out that in most places in the US, 
Muslim institutions are more ethnically diverse and less Palestine-concentrated 
than in the southwest suburbs of Chicago.] The majority of youth reported that their 
main sources of information about Palestine were the US and Arabic-language 
media, the latter being what their parents watched, and occasionally the stories of a 
relative returning from Palestine to the US. Rather than a collective narrative, these 
sources transferred unmediated images of violence. So, I would ask, if secularism in 
the post-Islamic key is passed down through family and learned in secular 
organizations, what shall be the fate of this type of secularism in the current 
generation of youth?  
 
Lybarger identifies two other, less politicized and more implicit, forms of “syncretic 
secularism” that emerged from his interviews. One he attributes to the “impact of 
assimilation processes,” while the other reflects a “disenchantment originating 
within the religious milieu itself.” Quotes from his interviews with a married couple, 
Ismael and Muna, are used to highlight the social processes that produce these two 
forms. Upon reading this section I saw the typical gendered upbringing patterns that 
characterize Palestinian American Muslim communities. Ismael, as a male, is 
allowed to attend public schools, mix socially with non-Arabs and non-Muslims, 
engage in activities that go against Islamic teachings, and work in the settings of his 
choice. Muna, as a female, is required to conform to her parents’ views of proper 
Muslim decorum and behavior, which likely excluded almost everything Ismael was 
allowed to do. The details notwithstanding — his enlistment in the Navy, her 
attendance at a strict Islamic school, his family in which piety was not central and 
hers where it was said to be but her father drank alcohol and engaged in non-
marital sex — it seems to me that for most Palestinian Muslim girls who decide that 
religious faith has low meaning for them, the path to that point almost certainly has 
to pass through the “religious milieu” or at least through strong religious 
socialization and expectations of conformity [unless their parents are secular, which 
produces more of the learned mode of the first type].  For similarly inclined boys, on 
the other hand, such a passage is not required, essential to, or informative of their 
“secular” choice. It is thus less likely that “assimilation” would seem to explain the 
female path and “disenchantment with religion” the male path. Surely, Muna had to 
engage in a different personal struggle than Ismael as to whether she was beckoned 
by faith in God. Although they interpret their paths in the ways that they did, I think 
they both experienced exposure to other ways of life (pluralism / assimilation) as 
well as disenchantment with religion, although they did so differently because of 
their very different gendered trajectories. In light of these gendered pathways, I 
would temper strict notions of assimilation and disenchantment, or external 
[pluralistic society for the male] versus internal [religious milieu for the female] 
social forces with notions of gendered agency. 
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Overall, I would like to see the author develop and refine each of these ideal types of 
secularism based on many more cases. When he does so, he not only will be able to 
convince the reader of his findings, he also will be able to tease out more fully what 
is going on, give more consideration to generational changes and gendered patterns, 
and reflect on where Palestinian secularism might be headed.  
 
 
 
 
